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CRIMINALIZING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC 





 Jimmy Gurulé*  
 
 
 INTRODUCTION  
Domestic terrorism poses a serious threat to U.S. national security.  
According to the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), “[i]deologically 
motivated lone offenders and small groups pose the most likely terrorist threat to the 
Homeland, with Domestic Violent Extremists (“DVEs”) presenting the most 
persistent and lethal threat.”1  Since 9/11, right-wing extremists have killed more 
people in the U.S. than foreign terrorists.2  Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
Director Christopher A. Wray raised these concerns at a hearing before the U.S. 
House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security.3  These self-radicalized 
violent extremists are “motivated by a variety of domestic terrorist ideologies, such 
as racially- and ethnically-motivated extremism, including white supremacist violent 
extremism, anti-government, and anti-authority violent extremism, and other 
ideological strains that drive terrorist violence,” according to the Department of 
Homeland Security.4  Moreover, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists, 
mostly white supremacists, make up a majority of domestic terrorism threats.5  Wray 
testified that the FBI averaged approximately 1,000 domestic terrorism investigations 
 
*Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.  The author served as Under Secretary of Enforcement, U.S. 
Department of the Treasury from 2001-2003, and played a prominent role in developing the U.S. Government’s 
counter-terrorism financing program.  I would like to thank Jeffrey Meehan, NDLS ‘22, for his excellent research 
assistance and Lauren Vaca, NDLS ‘21, for her invaluable efforts editing the article. 
1 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND THREAT ASSESSMENT 17 (2020). 
2 Peter Bergen et al., Terrorism in America After 9/11, NEW AM., https://www.newamerica.org/in-
depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (stating that 114 people 
were killed in attacks by right-wing terrorists in the United States as compared to 107 people killed by 
international terrorists). 
3 Worldwide Threats to the Homeland Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. (2020) 
[hereinafter Worldwide Threats to the Homeland] (statement of Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation). 
4 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM AND TARGETED 
VIOLENCE 4–5 (2019). 
5 Id. at 10. 
  





and had arrested about 120 domestic terrorism suspects in 2020, which demonstrates 
an escalating problem.6  Wray told the committee that white supremacists and anti-
government groups remain the most persistent and lethal threat to the Homeland.7   
In January 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a National 
Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin stating that: "[S]ome ideologically-motivated 
violent extremists with objections to the exercise of governmental authority and the 
presidential transition, as well as other perceived grievances fueled by false 
narratives, could . . . mobilize to incite or commit violence.”8  The DHS terrorism 
advisory bulletin warned that DVEs might be targeting elected officials and 
government facilities for deadly attack.9  Today, far right, DVE, and anti-government 
militia groups pose a greater threat to the Homeland than foreign terrorist 
organizations.10 
Despite the deadly threat posed by domestic terrorists, there is no federal 
statute punishing acts of domestic terrorism.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), the term 
“domestic terrorism” means activities that: 
(a) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State;  
(b)  appear to be intended—  
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or  
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnaping.11   
The prohibited conduct must also occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.12   
However, domestic terrorism is not a punishable offense in the federal 
criminal code.  Instead, prosecutors must prosecute acts of terrorism under other 
federal statutes.  Federal prosecutors could charge domestic terrorists with murder, 
kidnaping, and other violent crimes if there is federal jurisdiction over the offense.  In 
the absence of a federal nexus, state authorities would be responsible for prosecuting 
the domestic terrorists.  Ultimately, federal authorities must identify a federal offense 
that punishes the offender consistent with the severity of the crime and the defendant’s 
moral culpability.  Acts of domestic terrorism are often motivated by anti-
government, racial, ethnic, or religious hatred.  However, the substitute federal 
offenses may not fully capture the offender’s malevolent purpose in committing the 
crime.  Furthermore, federal hate crime legislation generally applies only where the 
crime affected interstate or foreign commerce or the protected person was 
participating in federally protected activity, such as public education, employment, 
 
6 Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, supra note 3.  
7 Id.  Wray testified that the FBI views the left-wing anti-fascist movement knowns as Antifa “as more of 
an ideology or a movement more than an organization.”  Id.  
8 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL TERRORISM ADVISORY SYSTEM BULLETIN 1 (Jan. 27, 2021), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/21_0127_ntas-bulletin.pdf. 
9 Id. 
10 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 18. 
11 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). 
12 Id. 
  




travel, or the enjoyment of public accommodations.13  Finally, hate crime laws do not 
cover crimes motivated by anti-government animus.  Ultimately, existing federal law 
is inadequate to deal with the problem.  Thus, there is a compelling case for 
criminalizing domestic terrorism. 
Foreign and domestic terrorist organizations do not act alone.  Individuals 
who embrace the terrorist organization’s goals, objectives, and ideology enable and 
facilitate their unlawful activities.  Terrorist sympathizers provide these extremist 
groups with funding, weapons, equipment, training, and logistical support.  While 
these individuals do not directly participate in terrorist attacks, their provision of 
material support facilitates these deadly activities.  Title 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, prohibits 
the provision of “material support or resources” to a “foreign terrorist organization.”14  
In enacting material support legislation, Congress made a finding that terrorist 
organizations “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such 
an organization facilitates that conduct.”15  The same holds true for the provision of 
material support to domestic terrorist organizations. 
Currently, there is no equivalent federal statute criminalizing material 
support for domestic terrorism.  Moreover, in the absence of proof that the defendant 
acted with the specific intent to commit a particular terrorist crime, the provision of 
material support would not be punishable under a theory of aiding and abetting or 
conspiracy.16  A terrorist sympathizer could sell weapons and explosives to a right-
wing militia group with knowledge of the group’s deadly agenda and avoid criminal 
liability by merely claiming that he lacked the specific intent to facilitate the 
commission of the predicate crime.  Thus, while it is a federal crime to provide 
material support or resources to foreign terrorist organization, the provision of 
assistance to a domestic terrorist group is not a punishable offense.  There is no 
compelling reason to distinguish between the provision of material support to foreign 
and domestic terrorist groups on this basis.  Persons that knowingly provide material 
support to domestic terrorist organizations support and sustain these groups and 
enable their terrorist-related activities. These persons are equally responsible for acts 
of terrorism perpetrated by these extremist groups. As such, they must be held 
accountable. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the threat to national security posed by right-
wing violent extremist groups, focusing on the January 6th, 2021 attack on the U.S. 
Capitol, as well as the conspiracy to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer.  
Violent, anti-government militia groups played a central role in both incidents.  Part 
II examines the ideology and organizational structure of three of the most prominent 
domestic terrorist groups, the Oath Keepers, Proud Boys, and Three Percenters, and 
 
13 See Matthew Shepard & James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 249; Fair Housing 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3631; Church Arson Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 247.  
14 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.  A violation of the material support statute is punishable by twenty years in prison. 
15 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 
1214, 1247 (1996). 
16 See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.06(3)(a) (providing that a person is an accomplice of another person in 
the commission of an offense if “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, 
he . . . aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it”).  See also MODEL PENAL CODE, § 
5.03(1) (“A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose 
of promoting or facilitating its commission he agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more 
of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime . . . .”).  
  





the threat they pose to national security.  Part III provides a brief overview of the 
federal material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which should serve as a model 
for criminalizing the provision of material support to domestic terrorist organizations.  
Part IV outlines a proposed statute to criminalize the provision of material support for 
domestic terrorism, focusing on the criteria and process for designating an entity as a 
“domestic terrorist organization.”  Finally, Part V critically analyzes the arguments 
launched against such legislative efforts to criminalize material support for domestic 
terrorist organizations. Specifically, this Part will address the claim that such conduct 
is protected by the First Amendment. However, this Part will demonstrate that the 
Supreme Court rejected a similar First Amendment argument with respect to the 
federal material support statute in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in 2010.17  
 
I.  THE THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY  
 
On January 6th, 2021, a domestic terrorism threat materialized when a 
violent mob of Trump supporters, including members of anti-government militia 
groups, stormed the U.S. Capitol. The mob interrupted a joint session of the U.S. 
House of Representatives and U.S. Senate convened in separate chambers of the U.S. 
Capitol building to certify the votes of the Electoral College for the 2020 Presidential 
Election.18  Vice President Mike Pence, assuming his constitutional duty as President 
of the Senate, presided over the Joint Session.  Vice President-elect Kamala D. Harris, 
in her role as a Senator representing California, was also present.  Convinced that 
voter fraud decided the Presidential election in favor of Joe Biden, the rioters 
attempted to “Stop the Steal” and prevent the peaceful transfer of power to President-
Elect Biden.  Hundreds of angry and violent Trump supporters vastly overwhelmed 
U.S. Capitol Police and forced entry into the Capitol building, breaking windows and 
ramming open doors.19  The rioters forcibly stormed past security barricades, 
attacked, and assaulted police officers with clubs, flagpoles, stun guns, and other 
weapons.20  Other crowd members encouraged and assisted the forced entry.  Some 
of the participants wore paramilitary gear: reinforced vests, helmets, goggles.21 They 
carried mace, tear gas, and wooden clubs.22  The insurgents assaulted U.S. Capitol 
Police and District of Columbia Metropolitan Police officers, killing one officer and 
inflicting injuries to over 130 others.23  Approximately eighty-one Capitol police 
officers and fifty-eight members of the Metropolitan Police Department were 
assaulted during the attack.24  The violent siege led to the death of five participants, 
 
17 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
18 See Indictment ¶ 4, United States v. Caldwell et al., Crim. No. 21-cr-28-APM (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2021) 
[hereinafter Caldwell Indictment]. 
19 Id. at ¶ 7. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at ¶¶ 26(f), (h). 
22 Id.  
23 See Daniel Villarreal, Capitol Police Union Reveals Cops Suffered “Brain Injuries,” Loss of Eye After 
Pro-Trump Riot, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/capitol-police-union-reveals-cops-
suffered-brain-injuries-loss-eye-after-pro-trump-riot-1564993. 
24 See Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18, at ¶ 10. 
  




including a woman that the mob trampled to death.25  A Capitol Police officer shot 
another woman when she attempted to make her way through a broken window of a 
door outside of the Speaker’s Lobby, a hallway that contains entrances to the House 
Chamber .26 
Members of the media were assaulted – cameras and other equipment were 
destroyed.27 The Capitol suffered millions of dollars in damage, including “broken 
windows and doors, graffiti, and residue of various pepper sprays, tear gas, and fire 
extinguishers deployed both by crowd members who stormed the Capitol and by 
Capitol Police officers trying to restore order.”28  Law enforcement agents later 
recovered two deadly pipe bombs placed outside the Democratic National Committee 
and Republican National Committee headquarters.29 
The violent invaders were carrying lead pipes, clubs, zip ties, explosives, 
chemical irritants, and waving Trump banners and Confederate flags.30  Apparently, 
the zip ties were going to be used to arrest members of Congress and charge them 
with treason and election fraud.31  Fearing for their safety, Capitol Police officers 
evacuated members of the House and Senate (including Vice President Pence and 
Vice President-elect Harris) from their respective chambers.  Members of the mob 
ransacked the office of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.  The rioters also chanted “Hang 
Mike Pence,” venting their anger and rage at the Vice President for his refusal to 
disregard the Electoral College votes and declare Trump the winner of the presidential 
election.32  Members of the angry mob stormed onto the floor of the House and Senate 
chambers.33 
 The rioters temporarily delayed Congress’ certification of the Electoral 
College vote.  The Joint Session of Congress and election certification proceedings 
were halted while Capitol Police and other law enforcement officers worked to restore 
order and clear the Capitol of the violent insurrectionists.  However, later that night, 
law enforcement regained control of the Capitol, and the Joint Session reconvened, 
presided over by Vice President Pence, who had remained hidden from the 
insurrectionists throughout the attack.34  Ultimately, President-elect Biden was 
certified as the next President of the United States. 
 
25 The 2014 U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines “insurgency” as the 
“organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or change political control of a region.”  U.S. 
ARMY/MARINE CORPS INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (May 2014).  
The goal of the insurgents was to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election. See also Jack Healy, 
These Are the 5 People Who Died in the Capitol Riot, N.Y. Times (Feb. 22, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/us/who-died-in-capitol-building-attack.html. 
26 The Journey of Ashli Babbitt, BELLINGCAT (Jan. 8, 2021), 
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2021/01/08/the-journey-of-ashli-babbitt/ .  
27 See Tiffany Hsu & Katie Robertson, Covering Pro-Trump Mobs, the News Media Became a Target, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/business/media/media-murder-capitol-
building.html.  
28 Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18, at ¶ 10. 
29 Tim Mak & Dina Temple-Raston, What We Know About the Suspect Who Planted Bombs Before the 
Capitol Riot, NPR.COM  (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/14/986457987/what-we-know-about-
the-suspect-who-planted-bombs-before-the-capitol-riot .  
30 Elain Godfrey, It Was Supposed to Be So Much Worse, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2021), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/01/trump-rioters-wanted-more-violence-worse/617614/ .  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18, at ¶ 9. 
  





The attack on the U.S. Capitol was not a spontaneous event.  Several anti-
government militia groups played a prominent role in organizing and leading the 
insurrection, including the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers.  These groups engaged in 
extensive planning and coordination for the January 6th operation.  The Proud Boys—
a far-right nationalist group with a history of violence—were key instigators in 
storming the Capitol.  According to government prosecutors, the Proud Boys’ 
Dominic Pezzola was “one of the first to lead the charge both outside and inside the 
Capitol, helping overwhelm Capitol police defenses after stealing an officer’s riot 
shield.”35  Before January 6th, 2021, social media posts by the Proud Boys indicated 
that they were organizing a large group that would attempt to overwhelm police 
barricades and enter the Capitol building.36  One member of the Proud Boys posted a 
video on Parler, which was captioned, “Let them remember the day they decided to 
make war with us.”37  In a social media post, dated January 4, 2021, a Proud Boys 
member declared, “We are in a war.”38  Additionally, the Proud Boys raised money 
on fundraising sites to pay for protective gear and communications equipment needed 
for the January 6th operation and fund their travel to Washington, D.C.39  Specifically, 
the founding member of the Proud Boys Hawaii Chapter raised funds via the internet 
to finance his travel to Washington, D.C. from Hawaii.40  
Meanwhile, the Oath Keepers – another anti-government militia- was also 
soliciting recruits to incite violence within the days following the November 
presidential election. In Ohio and North Carolina, Oath Keepers conducted military 
training.41 Using social media, text messaging, and messaging applications, they sent 
incendiary messages to recruit followers.42 They coordinated busloads of militia 
members to travel from North Carolina to Washington, D.C.  The Oath Keepers 
coordinated and trained with one date in mind: January 6th.  
Thirteen members of the Oath Keepers who were criminally charged in the 
U.S. Capitol attack began soliciting recruits for potential violence within days of the 
November 2020 presidential election.43 Later, the Oath Keepers conducted military 
training for members in Ohio and North Carolina and arranged the transportation of 
 
35 Rachel Weiner & Spencer S. Hsu, Actions by Proud Boy at Capitol show ‘planning, determination, and 
coordination,’ U.S. alleges, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2021, 7:23 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/brothers-charged-eugene-goodman-
chase/2021/01/29/80dec868-6239-11eb-afbe-9a11a127d146_story.html.  




40 Indictment ¶ 21, United States v. DeCarlo, Crim. No. 1:12-cr-73-BAH (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2021) [hereinafter 
DeCarlo Indictment]. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 There is some discrepancy as to how many Oath Keepers have been charged related to January 6th. As 
of publication of this Article, some new sources have claimed twelve Oath Keepers were charged, while others 
claim thirteen have been charged. This Article will operate under the assumption that thirteen Oath Keepers 
have been charged. See Alan Feuer, Oath Keeper Pleads Guilty and Will Cooperate in Jan. 6 Riot Inquiry, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/16/us/politics/oath-keeper-guilty-plea.html (noting 
that twelve Oath Keepers had been charged in the Capitol riots); Clare Hymes & Cassidy McDonald, Florida 
member of the Oath Keepers charged with conspiracy in connection to Capitol riot, CBS NEWS (March 11, 
2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/oath-keepers-capitol-riot-florida-conspiracy-charge-kenneth-harrelson/ 
(explaining that thirteen members of the Oath Keepers had been charged).  
  




weapons to Washington, D.C., according to U.S. authorities.44  The Oath Keepers and 
other anti-government militia groups used social media, text messaging, and 
messaging applications to send incendiary messages to recruit as many followers as 
possible to travel to Washington, D.C. for the January 6th operation.  Plans were made 
to transport a busload of militia members from North Carolina to Washington, D.C.45  
Members of the Oath Keepers also attended military training camps in Ohio and North 
Carolina.46  One member communicated to recruits, “I need you fighting fit by 
innauguration [sic].”47  She further added, “[I]t is our duty as Americans to fight, kill 
and die for our rights.”48  On January 6th, once inside the Capitol, members of the 
Oath Keepers communicated and coordinated their actions using a walkie-talkie 
application with a curated channel named “Stop the Steal J6.”49  On this channel, one 
member stated: “We have a good group.  We have about 30-40 of us.  We are sticking 
together and sticking to the plan.”50 
These militia groups did not act alone.  Instead, they received material 
support and money from other individuals and entities.  Weeks before the attack, 
right-wing activists who organized the “Stop the Steal” movement, hatched a plan to 
hold a major political rally in Washington, D.C. to coincide with Congress’ vote to 
certify the Electoral College votes.51  The purpose of the rally was to support former 
President Trump’s challenge to the election results and prevent Congress from 
certifying President-Elect Joe Biden as President, including by the use of intimidation 
and force.  According to media reports, a top Trump campaign fundraiser and donor 
funded the rally at the Washington Ellipse that preceded the January 6th riot.  “Julie 
Jenkins Fancelli, a prominent donor to the Trump campaign and heir[] to the Publix 
Super Markets Inc. chain,” allegedly committed $300,000 to the cause.52  Her 
donation accounted for the lion’s share of the $500,000 spent to organize the rally at 
the Ellipse where Trump spoke.53  Alex Jones, a far-right show host and conspiracy 
theorist, personally pledged more than $50,000 in seed money for the January 6th 
event.54  The Rule of Law Defense Fund (“RLDF”), a 501(c)(4) of the Republican 
Attorneys General Association (“RAGA”), helped organize and fund the protest 
preceding the deadly attack on the U.S. Capitol.55  The RAGA is a political 
organization that helps elect Republican attorneys general and can accept unlimited 
contributions from wealthy individuals and corporations.  RLDF appeared in a list of 
 
44 Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18, at ¶ 24.  
45 Id. at ¶ 34. 
46 Id. at ¶ 27. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at ¶ 29. 
49 Id. at ¶ 26(k).  
50 Id. at ¶ 74(a). 
51 Shalini Ramachandran et al., Jan. 6 Rally Funded by Top Trump Donor, Helped by Alex Jones, 





55 Laura Strickler & Lisa Cavazuti, Republican AGs group sent robocalls urging march to the Capitol, 
NBC News (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/republican-ags-group-sent-robocalls-
urging-march-capitol-n1253581.  
  





groups on the “March to Save America” website along with entities including Stop 
the Steal, Turning Point Action, Tea Party Patriots, and others.56   
Henry “Enrique” Tarrio, the national chairperson of the Proud Boys, raised 
money to support the group’s participation in the “Stop the Steal” rally using 
GiveSendGo.com, a Christian crowdfunding website that bills itself as “a place to 
fund hope.”57  According to one media report, within a week, the “Enrique Tarrio 
Defense Fund” raised more than $113,000 from 2,359 donors.58  “[A]t least $247,000 
[was] raised for 24 people—including at least eight members of the Proud Boys—
who claimed…that the money was intended for travel, medical or legal expenses 
connected” with the January 6th “Stop the Steal” rally.59  Nicholas Ochs, “a self-
described Proud Boy from Honolulu . . . raised $300 for expenses to attend the 
[January] 6 rally.”60  Ochs added, “[w]e will try not to get stabbed but if one of us 
does that’s when the real bucks come in so keep an eye out for that fundraiser too.”61  
“A GiveSendGo fund listed under the name of Zach Rehl, … the president of the 
Proud Boys Philadelphia Chapter, raised more than $5,500 for travel to the [January] 
6 event.”62  Another Proud Boy member raised $1,300 to fund travel to Washington, 
D.C. for the rally.63  One participant “asked donors to ‘sponsor a warrior’ and help 
‘buy body armor and other protection pieces for our patriots.’”64  Ultimately, money 
raised through GiveSendGo enabled members of the Proud Boys and other militia 
groups to travel to Washington, D.C. and participate in the violent siege of the U.S. 
Capitol.   
The FBI has arrested and charged over 300 participants in the attack on the 
U.S. Capitol.65  The federal charges include Obstruction of an Official Proceeding, 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), Destruction of Government Property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 2, 
Theft of Government Property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 2, Knowingly Entering or 
Remaining in Restricted Building and Grounds, 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1)–(2), and 
Aiding and Abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2.66  However, charging members of the violent 
mob with offenses like trespass, theft, and obstruction-related crimes is not enough.  
These criminal offenses do not accurately capture the severity of the crimes 
 
56 Jamie Corey, Republican Attorneys General Dark Money Group Organized Protest Preceding Capitol 
Mob Attack, DOCUMENTED.NET (Jan. 11, 2021), https://documented.net/2021/01/republican-attorneys-
general-dark-money-group-organized-protest-preceding-capitol-mob-attack/.   
57 Amy Brittain & David Willman, ‘A Place to Fund Hope’: How Proud Boys and Other Fringe Groups 







61 Id.  Ochs was arrested on a misdemeanor charge stemming from his participation in the assault on the 
Capitol.  With his criminal case pending, a new GiveSendGo page appeared in the “Legal Feeds for Nick Ochs” 




65 See Alanna Durkin Richer & Colleen Long, Charged in Jan. 6 riot? Yes, but prison may be another 
story, ASSOC. PRESS (May 1, 2021) (detailing that over 400 individuals have been arrested related to the January 
6th storming of the Capitol). 
66 See Caldwell Indictment, supra note 18.  See also DeCarlo Indictment, supra note 40.  
  




committed.  The insurrectionists violently attacked the seat of our nation’s democracy 
for the purpose of overturning the results of the 2020 presidential election.  This 
conduct far exceeds the severity of the criminal charges filed against the insurgents.  
Furthermore, what about the individuals behind the scenes that provided financial 
assistance, transportation, communications equipment, and other logistical support 
for the insurgents?  These individuals facilitated the events that occurred on January 
6th and should be held accountable.  However, no one has been charged with 
providing material support to the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, or other militia groups 
responsible for planning and leading the attack on the Capitol. 
The siege of the Capitol is not an isolated act of domestic terrorism.  In 
December 2020, a federal grand jury charged six men with conspiracy to kidnap 
Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer.67  The FBI arrested six individuals for 
plotting to kidnap the Democratic governor at her vacation home in northern 
Michigan.  The conspirators were members of a Michigan-based militia group called 
the “Wolverine Watchmen,” led by Ty Gerard Garbin.68  The conspirators 
participated in a “field training exercise,” where “the group practiced combat tactics, 
including assaulting motor vehicles using semiautomatic assault rifles and live 
ammunition.”69  At one field training exercise, the conspirators “attempted to detonate 
two improvised explosive devices.”70  They also “practiced assaulting a building in 
teams, and discussed tactics for fighting the Governor’s security detail with 
improvised explosive devices, a projectile launcher, and other weapons,” according 
to the indictment.71  One defendant instructed his co-conspirators in an encrypted 
video message that “if they encountered police during a reconnaissance, they should 
give the officers one opportunity to leave, and kill them if they did not comply.”72  
One conspirator “ordered $4,000 worth of explosives from an undercover FBI agent 
posing as a co-conspirator.”73  The co-conspirators were arrested after four members 
were to meet with an FBI undercover agent and purchase explosives and other 
supplies.   
Six members of the Wolverine Watchmen were charged with conspiracy to 
kidnap Governor Whitmer.  However, it is unclear whether the Wolverine Watchmen 
received material support and assistance from other individuals.  The indictment 
states that the conspirators conducted nighttime surveillance on Governor Whitmer’s 
vacation home using two-way radios and a night-vision scope.74  Their military 
training exercises involved the use of semiautomatic assault rifles and live 
ammunition and surveilled where to place improvised explosive devices under a 
bridge leading to Governor Whitmer’s vacation home to prevent law enforcement 
officers from responding to the scene of the crime.75  Where did the militia members 
 
67 Indictment, United States v. Fox et al., No. 1:20-cr-183-RJJ (W.D. Mich., Dec. 16, 2020). 
68 Id. at ¶ 2. 
69 Id. at ¶ 4–5. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at ¶ 11. 
72 Id. at ¶ 18. 
73 Id. at ¶ 15. 
74 Id. at ¶ 10. 
75 Jaclyn Peiser, In Whitmer kidnapping plot, extremists also wanted to blow up a bridge, tried to buy 
explosives, feds say, WASH. POST (April 29, 2021), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/04/29/whitemer-bridge-domestic-terrorism-michigan/.  
  





purchase their surveillance equipment, semi-automatic weapons, and materials used 
to construct the improvised explosive devices?  More importantly, did the suppliers 
of the surveillance equipment and deadly weapons have knowledge that the 
Wolverine Watchman were planning to kidnap the Michigan governor and engage in 
violent and unlawful activity?  Furthermore, who conducted the military training 
exercises?  Did the militia members receive training on how to construct the 
improvised explosive devices?  Did the individuals that provided the training have 
knowledge of the kidnaping plot?  Finally, did the members of the Wolverine 
Watchmen receive funding from sympathetic donors who embraced their ideology 
and violent agenda?  If so, the individuals that provided material support to these 
domestic terrorists with knowledge of their criminal objectives should be held 
accountable for enabling their criminal conduct.   
Federal law punishes the provision of material support or resources to a 
foreign terrorist organization.76  Unfortunately, there is no such provision that 
criminalizes material support to domestic terrorist groups.  Also, there is currently no 
process by which the government can designate domestic groups as domestic terrorist 
organizations. Such a designation, as a domestic terrorist organization, would allow 
the government to impose criminal and economic sanctions against these militia 
groups and individuals that provide support and assistance to them.  Domestic violent 
extremists, including right-wing, anti-government militia groups, pose a serious threat 
to national security.  Moreover, the individuals and entities that knowingly provide 
material support or resources to these radicalized groups enable their criminal 
conduct, like the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol and the plot to kidnap the 
Michigan governor.  In fact, according to FBI Director Wray, more deaths have been 
caused by DVEs that international terrorists in recent years.77  Under the current 
statutory regime, 18 USC § 2339B only covers individuals and entities that provide 
material support to foreign terrorist organizations – but not domestic organizations. 
There is no compelling reason for our legal system to criminalize providing material 
support to foreign terrorist organizations all the while turning a blind eye to similar 
conduct with domestic organizations. Recent events dramatically highlight the need 
to reconsider the existing legal framework for preventing and criminalizing material 
support for domestic terrorism. 
 
II.  DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS  
 
 
76 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
77 See Opening Remarks and Q&A, Dep’t of Justice, Senior FBI Official (Feb. 26, 2021) (on file with 
Dep’t of Justice), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1373306/download (“The primary terrorism threat to 
the homeland, without question, is from the lone offender, notably homegrown violent extremists as well as 
domestic violent extremists…”); see also Emily DeCiccio, Domestic terrorism has superseded the threat of 
interntaionl terrorism, warns ex-NYC police commissioner, CNBC (Jan. 15, 2021), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/15/domestic-terrorism-has-superseded-the-threat-of-international-terrorism-
warns-ex-nyc-police-commissioner.html; see also Statement of Christopher A. Wray, Director of Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, at 3 
(Sept. 17, 2020).  
  




According to FBI Director Wray, racially motivated violent extremism, 
mostly from white supremacists, recently has made up a majority of domestic 
terrorism threats.78  Wray stated that the FBI averaged roughly 1,000 domestic 
terrorism investigations annually and had recorded about 120 arrests on domestic 
terrorism in 2020.79  Furthermore, Wray made clear that white supremacist and anti-
government groups were the primary threats. 80 In particular, neo-Nazi groups such 
as Atomwaffen Division and the Base have been the target of the FBI.    
 
A.  OATH KEEPERS  
 
The Oath Keepers is one of the largest radical anti-government groups in the 
U.S. today.  Formed following President Obama’s election in 2009 by Yale Law 
School graduate Elmer Stewart Rhodes, the Oath Keepers claim to have up to 30,000 
members, most of whom are former or current law enforcement officers or military.81  
“Some members of the Oath Keepers believe that the federal government has been 
co-opted by a cabal of elites actively trying to strip American citizens of their 
rights.”82  While they will accept anyone as members, what differentiates the Oath 
Keepers from other anti-government groups is their focus on recruiting current and 
former military and law enforcement personnel.83  The militia’s name references the 
oath sworn by members of the military and police to defend the Constitution “from 
all enemies, foreign and domestic.”84  The Oath Keepers embrace the central 
conspiracy theory of the anti-government “Patriot” movement of which it is a part.  
“Patriots” believe that: 
 
[T]he government will at any moment impose martial law, probably with the 
aid of foreign or United Nations troops; that all guns belonging to normal 
citizens will then be seized; that the resisters will be thrown into concentration 
camps; and that, in the end, America will be forced into a one-world socialist 
government, ‘The New World Order.’85 
 
In 2013, the Oath Keepers announced the formation of “Citizen 
Preservation” militias, intended to defend Americans against the New World Order.86  
These militias have since been renamed “Civilian Preparedness Teams,” and their 
goal is to “revitalize the American militia movement. . . .”87  As reported by the 
 
78 See Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, supra note 3. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 About Oath Keepers, OATH KEEPERS, https://oathkeepers.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2021).  
According to the Oath Keepers website: “Oath Keepers is a non-partisan association of current and formerly 
serving military, police, and first responders, who pledge to fulfill the oath all military and police take to ‘defend 
the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.’”  Id.  See also Oath Keepers, S. POVERTY L. CTR., 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/oath-keepers (last visited Feb. 20, 2021) 
[hereinafter Groups Extremist Files]. 
82 See First Superseding Indictment at 4, United States v. Caldwell (D. D.C. Feb. 19, 2021) (No. 21-cr-28-
APM)  (charging nine members of the Oath Keepers with obstruction of an official proceeding and conspiracy 
to obstruct an official proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), 371, and other offenses). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 









Southern Poverty Law Center, Rhodes expressed his views on restoring the militia in 
the U.S. in a “Gods and Guns” podcast.88  He said:  
 
We want to see a restoration of the militia in this country. . . . We think a good 
first step is to have the veterans stand up in every community and go help form 
and train neighborhood watches, to get people to take back into their own hands 
their own personal self-defense and security.89    
 
Heavily armed members of the Oath Keepers showed up in Ferguson, 
Missouri, during the racial unrest that followed the killing of Michael Brown, an 
African American teenager, by police officers.  The heavily armed group members 
allegedly patrolled neighborhoods to protect white-owned businesses from rioters.90  
Today, the Oath Keepers have affiliates in several states across the country, including 
Ohio, North Carolina, Oregon, and Montana.91 
The Oath Keepers has a command structure. Their founder and leader is 
Stewart Rhodes.92  The group has the ability to recruit members across the country.  
While the exact number of members is unknown, the group’s membership is 
estimated to be in the thousands.  As previously noted, the Oath Keepers consists of 
affiliated militia groups across the country.  Furthermore, the Oath Keepers conducts 
military training for its members.  They have a command structure and ability to plan 
anti–government operations, which is evident from their ability to plan, coordinate, 
and execute the January 6th assault on the Capitol.93  Approximately thirteen 
members of the Oath Keepers have been indicted for their participation in the January 
6th, 2021 assault.94 
 
B.  PROUD BOYS  
 
The Proud Boys was formed in 2016 by Vice Media co–founder Gavin 
McInnes, a Canadian.95  The far–right, male–only group describes itself as a “pro–





91 The Ohio State Regular Militia is a subset of the Oath Keepers.  Government’s Memorandum in Support 
of Pre-Trial Detention at 3, United States v. Watkins (D.D.C. Feb.11, 2021) (1:21-cr-28-APM-3).  
92 Id. 
93 According to the FBI, Jessica Watkins, a former U.S. Marine who has been criminally charged for her 
role in the attack on the Capitol, considers herself the commander of the Ohio State Regular Militia which is 
affiliated with the Oath Keepers.  See id.  The FBI arrested other people suspected of being in the Oath Keepers, 
including Jon Schaffer, an Indiana musician and Larry R. Brock, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel from 
Texas.  See Adam Goldman et al., Investigators Eye Right-Wing Militias at Capitol Riot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/18/us/politics/capitol-riot-militias.html; see also Government’s 
Memorandum in Support of Pre-Trial Detention at 3, United States v. Watkins (D.D.C. Feb.11, 2021) (1:21-cr-
28-APM-3).  
94 Hymes & McDonald, supra note 43.  
95 See Proud Boys, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/group/proud-boys (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). 
  




modern world: aka Western Chauvinists.”96  While the actual membership is 
unknown, it is believed to be in the thousands.97 The group has forty-four active 
chapters across the country.98  The Proud Boys have a history of street violence, 
including against Black Lives Matter demonstrators.99  In the summer of 2017, neo-
Nazis, Klansmen, and other white supremacist groups participated in the “Unite the 
Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.  The organizer of the event was a member of 
the Proud Boys.100  In June 2018, the Proud Boys attended the “Freedom and 
Courage” rally in Portland, Oregon, where they engaged in violent clashes with Black 
Lives Matter protestors.101  The Proud Boys have an initiation process for new 
members, which includes taking an “oath.”102  Their members pay monthly dues.103  
Proud Boys members wear yellow and black apparel, as well as other clothing 
adorned with Proud Boys-related logos and emblems.104  
The Proud Boys have a command structure: the ability to communicate 
nationwide and direct the activities of their members.  The self-described chairperson 
of the Proud Boys, Enrique Tarrio, directs such activities.  Ethan Nordean heads the 
Washington State Proud Boys.105  Beginning as early as December 2020, Proud Boys 
organizers encouraged members to attend the January 6th, 2021 event in Washington, 
D.C.  Tarrio posted a message on the social media site Parler about the demonstration 
planned that day.106  He instructed the Proud Boys on how to dress for the event to 
avoid detection by law enforcement officers.107  Tarrio directed the Proud Boys to 
spread across downtown Washington, D.C. organized in smaller teams.108   
The Proud Boys were the single largest organized group that participated in 
the January 6th siege of the U.S. Capitol.109  Two Proud Boys are accused of leading 
the mob of insurrectionists.110  As of April of 2021, federal prosecutors have indicted 
approximately twenty-five Proud Boys for their role in the insurrection.111  During 
the attack on the Capitol, the Proud Boys wore a piece of orange tape on their hats, 
 
96 Statement of Facts, U.S. v. Nicholas DeCarlo, et al., (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021) (Crim. No. 21-mj-120).  See 
also Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant, ¶ 19, (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2021) (Case No. 
1:21-mj-00218) [hereinafter Proud Boys Complaint]. 
97 David D. Kirkpatrick & Alan Feuer, Police Shrugged Off the Proud Boys, Until They Attacked the 
Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/14/us/proud-boys-law-
enforcement.html?smid=em-share. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 Id.  See also Proud Boys, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/group/proud-boys (last visited May 3, 2021).  
102 Proud Boys Complaint, supra note 77, at ¶ 19. 
103 See Memorandum in Support of Pre-Trial Detention at 2,  United States v. Ethan Nordean, Crim. No. 
21-MJ-67 BAT (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2021).  
104 Kirkpatrick & Feuer, supra note 97.   
105 See Affidavit in Support of a Criminal Complaint at 2, United States. v. Ethan Nordean, Crim. No. 1:21-
cr-175 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2021). 
106 See Proud Boys Complaint, supra note 96, at ¶ 20.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Kirkpatrick & Feuer, supra note 97.  
110 Id.  
111 See Melissa Holzberg, 25th Man Affiliated With Proud Boys And His Brother Indicted by DOJ For 
Capitol Riot, Forbes (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/melissaholzberg/2021/04/05/25th-man-
affiliated-with-proud-boys-and-his-brother-indicted-by-doj-for-capitol-riot/?sh=4bfdf5926721 .  
  





helmets, or backpacks to identify themselves from other members of the crowd during 
the violent assault.112 
In February 2021, less than a month after members of the Proud Boys joined 
the violent mob that stormed the U.S. Capitol, the Canadian government designated 
the entity a terrorist organization, adding the far-right group to a list of terrorist 
organizations that includes al Qaeda, ISIS, and al-Shabab.113  Designation as a terrorist 
organization carries financial and legal consequences.  Police can seize the property 
of the group and its members; banks can seize their assets.114  Additionally, it is a 
crime to provide material assistance to a designated terrorist organization.115  Finally, 
group members can be denied entry to Canada.116 
In order to be designated a domestic terrorist organization under Canadian 
law, a criminal or security intelligence report is submitted to the Minister of Public 
Safety for consideration.117  The Minister then determines whether “there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that (a) the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted 
to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or (b) the entity has 
knowingly acted on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity 
referred to in paragraph (a).”118  If the Minister finds reasonable grounds, then she 
may make a recommendation to have the entity placed on the list of terrorist 
organizations.119 
The Canadian government also listed the Atomwaffen Division, a neo-Nazi 
group whose members participated in the violent Unite the Right rally in 
Charlottesville and the Base, another neo-Nazi group.  Announcing the designation 
of the Proud Boys and two other domestic terrorist organizations, Public Safety 
Minister Bill Blair stated, “Their violent actions and rhetoric are fueled by white 
supremacy, anti-Semitism, racism, homophobia, Islamophobia and misogyny.”120   
 
C.  OTHER ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUPS  
 
The Three Percenters is an anti-government group.  Their name is a reference 
to the purported three percent of the American colonial population that rose up to 
fight the British Army in the American Revolution.121  Unlike the Oath Keepers and 
Proud Boys, the Three Percenters lack a hierarchical leadership and organized 
 
112 See Proud Boys Complaint, supra note 96, at ¶ 40. 
113 Amanda Coletta, Canada Declares the Proud Boys a Terrorist Group, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2021), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/canada-proud-boys-terrorist-capitol-
siege/2021/02/03/546b1d5c-6628-11eb-8468-21bc48f07fe5_story.html. 
114 Canadian Criminal Code §83.08, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 About the Listing Process, PUB. SAFETY CAN., https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-
trrrsm/lstd-ntts/bt-lstng-prcss-en.aspx (last updated Feb. 3, 2021). 
118 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., c. C-46, § 83.05(1) (1985).   
119 About the Listing Process, supra note 117.  
120 Coletta, supra note 113.  The Canadian government has designated at least two other neo-Nazi groups, 
Blood & Honor and Combat 18.  Id.  The United States has not designated a single domestic terrorist group. 
121 Three Percenters, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/three-
percenters (last visited May 3, 2021). 
  




national, state, and local chapters.122  The Boogaloo Boys is considered a right-
leaning, anti-government group that has connections to white supremacy and 
advocates for a second civil war.  “The boogaloo culture operates as a diffuse 
movement rather than a traditional group organizational structure with a single 
leader.”123  However, the Southern Poverty Law Center claims that the Boogaloo 
Boys has chapters in at least forty states.124  Finally, there is scant public information 
about the Wolverine Watchmen, the right-wing militia group that plotted to kidnap 
Michigan’s governor, Gretchen Whitmer. 
 
III.  PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO FOREIGN TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS  
 
A.  STATUTORY FRAMEWORK  
 
As part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, making it a federal crime to provide material 
support or resources “knowing or intending” that they be used in preparation for, or 
in carrying out, statutorily enumerated crimes.125  Congress further recognized that 
“[c]utting off ‘material support or resources’ from terrorist organizations deprives 
them of the means with which to carry out acts of terrorism and potentially leads to 
their demise.”126  
Two years later, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, criminalizing the 
provision of material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.  In 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, the court examined the legislative history of 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B, stating: 
 
Congress enacted § 2339B in order to close a loophole left by § 2339A.  
Congress, concerned that terrorist organizations would raise funds “under the 
cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise,” sought to pass legislation that 
would “severely restrict the ability of terrorist organizations to raise much 
needed funds for their terrorist acts within the United States.”  As § 2339A was 
limited to donors intending to further the commission of specific federal 
offenses, Congress passed § 2339B to encompass donors who acted without the 
intent to further federal crimes.127 
 
Section 2339B requires proof that the defendant “(1) knowingly provided 
material support[;] (2) to an organization designated as a foreign terrorist 
organization[; and] (3) with knowledge of the organization’s status as an FTO, or 
 
122 Antigovernment Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-
files/ideology/antigovernment (last visited May 3, 2021).  




125 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 12005(a), 108 Stat. 
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v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
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knowing that it engages in terrorism.”128  The defendant must have knowledge that 
the foreign organization has been designated an FTO by the Secretary of State or that 
the organization has engaged or engages in “terrorist activity” or “terrorism.”129  
However, the government is not required to prove the defendant acted with the 
specific intent to commit a terrorist attack or to further the ideological goals of the 
terrorist group.130  Under § 2339B, a defendant who acts with knowledge of the 
foreign entity’s connections to terrorism is criminally liable, even if harboring a 
benign intent or purpose. 
While Congress’s principal aim was to deprive FTOs of funding, the statute 
punishes other forms of material support.  The term “material support or resources” 
means:  
 
Any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary 
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert 
advice or assistance, safe-houses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, 
personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and 
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.131  
 
The material support statute is unprecedented in breadth and scope.  In 
essence, § 2339B is a relaxed aiding and abetting statute.  The statute does not punish 
the perpetrator of a terrorist attack, but instead it punishes enablers who provide 
assistance to the terrorist organization.  Under traditional accomplice liability, the 
aider and abettor must share the intent of the principal and intend the commission of 
the target offense.  However, under the material support statute, the government only 
has to prove that the offender acted with knowledge of the recipient’s membership in 
an FTO or association with a foreign entity engaged in terrorist activity.  The offender 
is liable even if he does not embrace the political objectives of the foreign group or 
lacks the intent to further the group’s illicit activities.  For example, a gun dealer who 
sells weapons to an FTO with the requisite knowledge is liable even if his actions 
were motivated solely to make a profit from the commercial transaction.  Similarly, 
a person who makes a financial contribution to members of an FTO regardless of his 
or her purpose or intent, violates the material support statute. 
Under the statute, “[w]hoever knowingly provides material support or 
resources to [an FTO], or attempts or conspires to do so,” can be convicted.132  Thus, 
not only does § 2339B punish the actual provision of material support or resources to 
an FTO, but it also creates criminal liability for the inchoate offenses of attempt and 
conspiracy to do so.  A person who attempts to provide support to an FTO, as well as 
someone who conspires to assist an FTO – but falls short – 
 
128 JIMMY GURULÉ & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 261 (2011).  See 
also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
129 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
130 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2010). 
131 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).  The term “training” means “instruction or teaching designed to impart a 
specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.”  Id. § 2339A(b)(2).  The term “expert advice or assistance” 
means “advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.”  Id. § 
2339A(b)(3). 
132 Id. § 2339B(b)(1). 
  




is punishable under the statute.  The material support statute does not require proof 
that the defendant facilitated a terrorist attack or even that the FTO received assistance 
from the defendant.  The defendant is liable solely if he attempts or conspires to 
provide such assistance. 
  
B.  FTO DESIGNATION PROCESS 
 
The authority to designate an entity a “foreign terrorist organization” resides 
with the Secretary of State.133  Under 8 U.S.C. § 1189, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and Attorney General, may designate a 
foreign organization upon finding that:  
(A)  the organization is a foreign organization; 
(B)  the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in 
section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title) or terrorism (as defined in 
section 2656f(d)(2) of Title 22) or retains the capability and 
intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and  
(C)  the terrorist activity or terrorism threatens national security or 
security of United States nationals.134  
 
In making an FTO designation, the Secretary of State compiles an 
“administrative record” and makes “findings” based on this record.135  The Secretary 
may base this designation on classified information. And the designated party is not 
entitled to notice prior to the designation.136  Seven days before designating an 
organization as an FTO, the Secretary of State must submit to key congressional 
leaders a “classified communication” detailing the Secretary’s findings.137  The State 
Department then publishes the designation in the Federal Register.138 Once an entity 
has been designated an FTO, that designation may be revoked in three ways:  
 
(1) Congress blocks or revokes a designation, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(5); 
(2) the Secretary revokes the designation based on a finding that 
changed circumstances or national security warrant a revocation, 8 
U.S.C. § 1189(a)(6)A); or (3) the D.C. Circuit sets aside the 
designation under 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3).139 
 
The legal consequences of being designated an FTO are severe.  First, 
financial institutions must freeze any and all FTO assets located within the 
jurisdiction of the U.S.140  Second, representatives and members of the FTO are 
 
133 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189(a)(1), (d)(4).  The Secretary of State has designated seventy-two organizations as 
FTOs.  See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-
organizations/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
134 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1).   
135 Id. § 1189(a)(3)(A). 
136 See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
137 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i). 
138 Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
139 United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d 157, 163 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
140 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2). 
  





prohibited from traveling to the U.S.141  Finally, § 2339B imposes severe criminal 
sanctions for providing material support or resources to an FTO.142 
 
IV.  PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS  
 
While federal law criminalizes the provision of material support to a foreign 
terrorist organization, there is no equivalent statute that criminalizes material support 
to domestic terrorist organizations.  Furthermore, there is no legal mechanism for the 
FBI or other government agency to label groups as domestic terrorist organizations 
and impose economic sanctions against such entities.  Thus, individuals can sell 
military-style weapons and explosives to violent right-wing extremist groups, provide 
their members military-style training, make generous monetary donations to support 
their cause, and provide other forms of material support with impunity.       Absent 
evidence that the actor had the intent or knowledge that his or her material support 
would be used to commit a particular crime, such conduct is lawful.  However, even 
the provision of material support with benign intent can promote acts of terrorism. 
 
A.  STATUTE OVERVIEW  
 
To address this serious gap in the law, Congress should enact a domestic 
material support statute.  The new statute would make it a crime to provide “material 
support or resources” to a “domestic terrorist organization” (“DTO”).  The statute 
would adopt the same definition of “material support or resources” included in the 
federal material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.143  Furthermore, the statute 
would require proof that the accused acted with knowledge that the organization was 
designated a “domestic terrorist organization” or engages in, or has engaged in, acts 
of “domestic terrorism” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).144  However, the 
government would not be required to prove that the defendant had the specific intent 
to further a domestic terrorist organization’s illicit activity.145  
Under the proposed statute, any financial institution that knows it has 
possession of, or control over, any funds in which a DTO, or its agent, has an 
interest146 would be required to freeze those funds.  Financial institutions would also 
be required to report the existence of these funds to the Treasury Department. The 
statute that prohibits the provision of material support to an FTO has a similar 
provision .147  Additionally, any financial institution that knowingly fails to comply 
with the blocking and reporting requirements would be subject to a civil penalty. 
Financial institutions that violate §2339B(2)(b) trigger a $50,000 penalty per 
violation or a penalty worth twice the amount of funds the financial institution was 
 
141  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i). 
142 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).  Upon conviction, § 2339B imposes a term of imprisonment of not more than 
twenty years and, if the death of any person results, incarceration for any term of years or for life.  Id. 
143 18 U.S.C. §2339A(b)(1). 
144 Id. §2331(5). 
145 See discussion infra Section V. 
146 See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neil 315 F. 3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002) (defining “beneficial interest”). 
147 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2)(A). 
  




required to retain control over. 148  A similar penalty should be imposed on banks for 
failing to block the assets of DTOs and report the existence of such funds to the 
Treasury Department. 
Whoever violates this DTO statute should be subject to a term of 
imprisonment of not more than twenty years, and, if death of any person results, shall 
be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.149  However, a lesser penalty should 
be provided for the provision of de minimis support to a DTO.  De minimis 
determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis: aid and assistance that would 
not facilitate the illicit activities of a DTO in a significant manner should be 
prosecuted as a misdemeanor offense. These misdemeanor offenses should result in 
a maximum penalty of one-year imprisonment.  For example, providing a single 
monetary donation of less than $500 to a DTO on a GoFundMe site should subject 
the offender misdemeanor liability.  Criminal prosecution for these lesser offenses 
would still have a deterrent effect and prevent sympathetic donors from providing 
monetary assistance to a DTO.  On the other hand, the sale of military-style weapons 
or explosives to a DTO, with knowledge of the DTO’s designation or knowledge of 
their terrorist activities should warrant felony prosecution.  This type of material 
support is essential to facilitating the group’s terrorist activities.  While there is clearly 
no bright line on what constitutes de minimis support, the statute should distinguish 
between minor and major assistance to a DTO. 
 
B.  DTO DESIGNATION PROCESS  
 
Not every group that engages in violent conduct should be designated a DTO 
under the proposed statute.  Only groups that threaten national security should be 
given that designation.  The government’s decision to designate a group a DTO 
should be guided by objective factors, rather than a subjective determination.  At least 
three factors are highly probative on the matter: (1) the ideology of the group; (2) 
organizational structure of the entity; and (3) its history of violent behavior. For 
example, a right-wing, extremist paramilitary group dedicated to overthrowing the 
U.S. government that uses violence to oppose government action poses a grave 
national security risk.  On the other hand, a criminal organization may threaten public 
safety, but does not necessarily pose a national security threat.  The Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute punishes enterprise 
criminality.150  A RICO association-in-fact enterprise requires three structural 
features: “a purpose, relationships among [those associated with the enterprise], and 
longevity sufficient to permit [these] associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”151  
However, not every association-in-fact enterprise engaged in criminal activity 
presents a threat to national security.  For example, a RICO enterprise engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking or health care fraud would not constitute a 
national security threat. Ultimately, the purpose of these criminal groups is to make a 
profit by illicit means, not challenge government authority or policy by threats or acts 
of violence. Thus, the standard for making a DTO designation should be much higher.   
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First, when considering whether to designate an entity a DTO, the 
government agency should consider the ideology of the group.  Specifically, what is 
the avowed mission and purpose of the group?  If a domestic entity is committed to 
overthrowing the government, challenging government policy by violent means, or 
killing members of ethnic, national, or religious groups, these organizations raise 
serious national security concerns.  In fact, targeting someone for killing because of 
their nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion may constitute genocide.  Genocide is 
defined as killing or causing serious bodily harm to members of a national, ethnical, 
racial, or religious group with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” members 
the group.152  Certainly, white supremacist and other hate groups that commit acts 
dangerous to human life intended to intimidate, coerce, or destroy members of ethnic 
or religious groups should be designated a DTO.   
Second, the organizational structure of the group is probative on the issue of 
national security.  For example, a small, loosely organized, and dispersed group is 
unlikely to pose a danger to national security.  On the other hand, domestic groups 
with a command structure and leadership control, and the ability to plan and execute 
violent attacks pose a greater security threat.  Other probative factors include the size 
of the group, whether it governs by rules, its recruitment and fundraising capabilities, 
the existence of a communications infrastructure, whether it conducts military 
training, and its members possess military-style weapons.  Another consideration is 
the complexity and sophistication of the acts of violence committed by the domestic 
organization. 
Whether to designate an entity as a DTO should also focus on the violent 
behavior of the group.  Designation should require proof that the group engages in 
acts of domestic terrorism as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).  Specific considerations 
include the number of terrorist attacks and acts of violence committed by the group.  
Other highly relevant factors include the number of casualties and extent of serious 
injuries caused by these attacks.  The extent of the destruction of property is probative 
as well.  The larger the number of terrorist attacks and resulting casualties, the greater 
the threat to national security posed by the entity.  Another consideration is the 
complexity of these groups’ terror plots.  Groups that are able to plan and execute 
complex terrorist attacks pose a greater danger to national security.  Ultimately, there 
should be  a direct correlation between the ideology, organizational structure, and 
violent history of the group and the threat to national security.  Only groups that pose 
a serious risk to national security should be designated a DTO.   
Applying these three factors, a compelling case can be made for designating 
the Oath Keepers as a DTO.  First, the Oath Keepers is an anti-government militia. 
Their members believe  that the government is going to impose martial law, suspend 
the Second Amendment and seize all privately owned guns, and place anti-
government protestors in concentration camps. They are committed to taking back 
their country by violent means, which was demonstrated on January 6th, where the 
Oath Keepers stormed the U.S. Capitol and assaulted and injured dozens of Capitol 
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Police and District of Columbia police officers. Ultimately, the ideology and avowed 
purpose of the Oath Keepers raise serious national security concerns. 
Second, the organizational structure of the Oath Keepers supports 
designating them as a DTO. Stewart Rhodes is the leader of the organization 
exercising command and control over its members, including their activities in 
Washington, D.C. on January 6th.  Media reports indicate that Rhodes was in regular 
cell phone communication with his subordinates during the January 6th attack on the 
U.S. Capitol, directing and coordinating the movement and activities of the Oath 
Keepers on the ground.  The Oath Keepers also provide military-style training to their 
members.  Additionally, the Oath Keepers have nationwide recruitment capabilities.  
They claim to have 30,000 members with chapters located in several states across the 
country.  
Finally, the Oath Keepers have a history of threats and acts of violence. Their 
members have attended protests in Ferguson, Missouri, Portland, Oregon, and 
elsewhere heavily armed with military-style weapons.  Several of their members 
engaged in violent confrontations with Black Live Matter demonstrators and 
members of Antifa. Their violent propensities were clearly demonstrated on January 
6th where their members dressed for military battle entered the U.S. Capitol by force, 
attacking federal police officers with deadly force, and damaging government 
property in an effort to prevent the peaceful transfer of presidential power.  Their 
actions constituted an attack on democracy which poses a serious threat to national 
security.153   
 
V.   THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENACTING A DOMESTIC MATERIAL-SUPPORT 
STATUTE  
 
 Two arguments have been raised against criminalizing the provision of 
material support to designated domestic terrorist organizations.  First, opponents 
argue that the provision of material support to domestic terrorists is already prohibited 
by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.  Therefore, enacting a new domestic terrorism statute is 
unnecessary.  Second, the anti-legislation crowd argues that a domestic material-
support statute would violate freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.  
Both arguments must be rejected for several reasons.  First, § 2339A imposes a 
heightened mens rea requirement. This higher state of mind requirement makes it 
difficult to convict secondary actors under that statute.  Second, § 2339A is limited in 
scope and does not cover several of the crimes committed by the January 6th 
insurrectionists and perpetrators of the plot to kidnap Michigan Governor Whitmer.  
Next, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project the Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
a similar First Amendment claim involving § 2339B, providing material support to a 
foreign terrorist organization.154 
 
A.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A  
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Under § 2339A, it is a federal crime to provide material support or resources 
“knowing or intending” that such support or resources are to be “used in preparation 
for, or in carrying out” one or more statutorily enumerated crimes.155  The enumerated 
crimes are varied and include such offenses as bombing a place of public use, 
government facility, public transportation system, or infrastructure facility, § 2332f, 
killing an officer or employee of the United States while such person is engaged in or 
on account of the performance of official duties, § 1114, and hostage taking, § 1203.  
Section 2339A does not distinguish between foreign and domestic terrorist 
organizations.  In fact, the statute does not require that the recipient of the material 
support be a member of any terrorist group.  Instead, the intended beneficiary could 
be a lone wolf terrorist, or someone engaged in criminal activity unrelated to any 
political, religious, or racial ideology.  Section 2339A does not focus on the status of 
the recipient (i.e., whether the accused is a member of a designated terrorist 
organization) but rather on the defendant’s mental state.  The statute requires that the 
defendant act with knowledge or intent that the material support be used in 
preparation for or to commit a statutorily enumerated crime.  The perpetrator’s 
scienter is essential to proving a violation of § 2339A.  The accused is not liable under 
the statute unless he acts with the requisite mental state. 
The heightened mens rea requirement imposes a significant legal obstacle for 
successful prosecution under the statute.  For example, an individual could sell 
military-style weapons to members of a violent, extremist anti-government militia 
with knowledge of the militia group’s extremist ideology and violent propensities.  
However, unless the weapons dealer had knowledge that the members of the militia 
group were going to use the firearms to engage in criminal conduct prohibited in § 
2339A or intended the guns to be used for such purpose, he would not be liable under 
the statute.  Moreover, the statute requires actual, subjective knowledge.  A violation 
of the statute could not be sustained on proof that the gun dealer “should have known” 
that the weapons were going to be used for a criminal purpose.  The statute requires 
proof of actual knowledge or intent, not mere negligence.  Thus, the gun dealer could 
likely avoid liability by merely claiming that he acted with a benign purpose such as 
making a profit from the sale of the weapons or lacked knowledge of the militia 
group’s purpose for acquiring the firearms.  In the absence of additional incriminating 
evidence demonstrating the defendant’s knowledge or intent, the accused would 
likely escape prosecution under the statute.   
Any proposed domestic terrorism statute should include a relaxed mens rea 
standard, similar to that required for a violation of § 2339B.  Section 2339B requires 
that “a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist 
organization . . . that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . 
or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.”156  Any proposed 
domestic terrorism statute should require proof that the accused have knowledge that 
the organization is a designated “domestic terrorist organization” or has engaged or 
engages in acts of domestic terrorism as defined by § 2331(5).  It would not require 
proof of the heightened “knowing or intending” standard in § 2339A. 
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Prosecuting secondary actors under § 2339A is problematic for one other 
reason.  The enumerated offenses included in the statute are limited in scope.  To date, 
the most serious charge filed against the participants in the attack against the U.S. 
Capitol is obstruction of an official proceeding, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1512(a)(2)(A).  The statute authorizes imprisonment of not more than twenty years.157  
However, the obstruction of justice statute is not a predicate crime enumerated in § 
2339A.  Therefore, even if the persons that provided material support and resources 
to the insurrectionists acted with the requisite mens rea, such individuals could not be 
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.  Another glaring omission from the list of 
enumerated offenses is seditious conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 2384.  If people sympathetic 
to the cause of the Proud Boys or Oath Keepers gave them money or arranged their 
transportation to Washington, D.C. with knowledge of their plan to violently attack 
the U.S. Capitol, such individuals could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.  
Seditious conspiracy is not a predicate offense under § 2339A. 
Section 2339A does not prohibit the provision of military-style training to 
DTOs.  A military veteran could provide weapons and explosives training to members 
of a DTO without violating § 2339A.  Section 2339D prohibits the receipt of military-
style training from an organization designated as an FTO.158  This offense is included 
in the list of enumerated offenses under § 2339A.  However, there is no equivalent 
statutory provision for the provision of military training to a DTO.  In this scenario, 
neither the persons providing the military training nor the members of the DTO 
receiving the training are guilty of violating any federal statute.  Thus, the secondary 
actors that provided material support or resources to the insurrectionists on January 6 
are not going to face prosecution under § 2339A for their role in enabling the violent 
assault on the U.S. Capitol. 
Finally, conspiracy to commit kidnaping, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c), is not 
included as a predicate offense in 18 U.S.C § 2339A.  Therefore, any individuals that 
provided material support or resources to members of the violent militia group that 
conspired to kidnap Michigan Governor Whitmer could not be prosecuted under § 
2339A.  This is another glaring omission in the federal material support statute.  
Ultimately, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A has no meaningful application against the secondary 
actors that participated in either the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol or the 
conspiracy to kidnap the Michigan governor, two of the most egregious acts of 
domestic terrorism since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 that killed 168 innocent 
people, including nineteen      children.  Under the current legal regime, individuals 
can provide material support or resources to domestic right-wing extremists with 
knowledge of their anti-government and racist ideology and violent tendencies with 
impunity.  The need for a federal statute criminalizing material support to DTOs is 
therefore urgent and compelling. 
 
B.  FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS  
 
The critics of a domestic material support statute maintain that it would 
violate freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.  In Holder v. 
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Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument. 159  In 
Humanitarian Law Project, plaintiffs sought to provide support for the lawful, non-
violent activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (also known as the Partiya Karkeran 
Kurdistan, or PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  These groups 
had been designated FTOs under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.160  Plaintiffs challenged § 
2339B’s prohibition of four types of material support; “training,” “expert advice or 
assistance,” “service,” and “personnel.”161  Plaintiffs claimed that § 2339B prohibited 
them from engaging in certain activity.  With respect to the PKK, plaintiffs sought to 
(1) train members of the PKK on the use of humanitarian and international law to 
peacefully resolve disputes; (2) engage in political advocacy on behalf of the Kurds 
living in Turkey; and (3) teach PKK members how to petition various representative 
bodies such as the United Nations for relief.162  With respect to the LTTE, plaintiffs 
intended to (1) train members of the LTTE to present claims for tsunami-related aid 
to mediators and international bodies; (2) provide legal assistance in negotiating 
peace agreements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government; and (3) 
participate in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.163 
Plaintiffs maintained that applying the material support statute to prevent 
them from engaging in these activities violated the Constitution.  In particular, they 
claimed that the statute infringes on their rights to freedom of speech and 
association.164  The Court rejected plaintiffs’ First Amendment arguments, holding 
that the material support statute was constitutional as applied to plaintiffs’ desired 
activities.165  
The Court addressed the particular speech plaintiffs proposed to undertake.  
First, plaintiffs sought to train members of the PKK on how to use humanitarian and 
international law to      peacefully resolve disputes.  The Court held that Congress can, 
consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit “training.”  The Court stated: “It is 
wholly foreseeable that the PKK would use the ‘specific skill[s]’ that plaintiffs 
proposed to impart, [§] 2339A(b)(2), as part of a broader strategy to promote 
terrorism.”166  
Second, plaintiffs proposed to teach PKK members how to petition various 
international organizations for relief and teach the LTTE how to present claims for 
tsunami-related aid to international bodies.  The Court stated that the government may 
ban this type of speech because it teaches the FTO how to acquire “relief,” which 
 
159 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
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could include monetary aid.167 “Money is fungible,” the Court noted, and “Congress 
logically concluded that money a terrorist group . . .  obtains using the techniques 
plaintiffs propose to teach could be redirected to funding the group’s violent 
activities.”168 
Finally, plaintiffs proposed engaging in political advocacy on behalf of the 
Kurds living in Turkey and participating in political advocacy on behalf of the Tamils 
residing in Sri Lanka.169  The Court held that the material support statute does not ban 
“‘pure political speech.’”170  Under the statute, according to the Court, “plaintiffs may 
say anything they wish on any topic[,]” “speak and write freely about the PKK and 
LTTE,” and “advocate” on their behalf.171  The Court noted that “‘[t]he statute does 
not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind.’”172 And the Court 
opined that “Congress has not . . . sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the form of 
‘pure political speech.’”173  Rather, the Court said that the statute prohibits “‘material 
support,’ which most often does not take the form of speech at all.”174  “And when it 
does,” the Court clarified, “the statute is carefully drawn to cover only a narrow 
category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups 
that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations.”175   
Applying a strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court found that the 
“Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest 
order.”176  Plaintiffs countered, arguing that the statute was not narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest because their support would advance only the legitimate, non-
violent activities of the designated terrorist organizations.177  The Court dismissed 
this argument, noting that when Congress enacted § 2339B, it made specific findings 
regarding the serious threat posed by international terrorism.  One of the findings, the 
Court observed, explicitly rejects plaintiffs’ contention that their support would not 
further the terrorist activities of the two FTOs.  Congress found: “foreign 
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct 
that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”178  The Court 
further declared that Congress’s reference to “any contribution” was not limited to 
monetary support but reflects “a determination that any form of material support 
furnished ‘to’ a foreign terrorist organization should be barred.”179  Even material 
support meant to promote lawful conduct can further acts of terrorism by “free[ing] 
up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends.”180  The 
Court observed, “[t]errorist organizations do not maintain organizational ‘firewalls’ 
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that would prevent or deter … sharing and commingling of support and benefits.”181  
The Court stated that “money is fungible.”182  Funds raised for charitable or non-
violent purposes could be redirected to purchase arms and explosives.  Thus, all 
contributions to FTOs further their illegal activities. 
 In response to vagueness concerns, Congress narrowed the statute and 
defined the terms “training,” “personnel,” and “expert advice or assistance.”183  
Furthermore, in an attempt to address First Amendment concerns, Congress created 
limited exceptions to the ban on material support, excluding, for example, medicine 
and religious materials, the Court observed.184 Congress also avoided any restriction 
on “independent advocacy.”185  Only conduct that is directed, coordinated with, or 
under the control of an FTO is prohibited under the statute.  The Court declared: 
“Independent advocacy that might be viewed as promoting the group’s legitimacy is 
not covered.”186 
Finally, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ freedom of association argument.  The 
statute does not penalize mere association with an FTO or the vigorous promotion of 
the political goals of the group, the Court stated.187  Instead, what § 2339B prohibits 
is the act of giving material support to a designated FTO.  The Court held that “in 
regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign 
terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective consistent with the 
limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments.”188 
The Court’s reasoning in Humanitarian Law Project applies with equal force 
to criminalizing material support to domestic terrorist organizations.  First, the 
government’s interest in combating domestic terrorism is also “an urgent objective of 
the highest order.”189  According to FBI Director Wray, violent anti-government 
militia groups pose a serious threat to national security.190  Furthermore, right-wing 
militia groups played a central role in planning and leading the January 6th attack on 
the U.S. Capitol.191  Thirteen members of the Oath Keepers have been charged with 
a variety of crimes stemming from the violent siege of the Capitol, most prominently 
conspiracy to break into the Capitol and interfere with Congress’s certification of the 
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Electoral College votes.192  And as of May 3rd, at least twelve members of the Proud 
Boys are facing federal criminal charges for their role in entering the U.S. Capitol by 
force and attempting to stop, delay, and hinder the congressional proceedings 
occurring that day.193  This violent conduct resulted in killing five individuals and 
assaulting over 130 U.S. Capitol and D.C. Metropolitan police officers and injuring 
dozens of others.194  The insurrectionists further threatened the lives of members of 
Congress, who had convened in a joint session to certify the Electoral College votes.  
Members of the pro-Trump mob also intended to kill Vice President Mike Pence, 
chanting “Hang Mike Pence” as they rampaged through the halls of the U.S. 
Capitol.195 
Members of a Michigan-based anti-government militia group plotted to 
kidnap and kill Governor Gretchen Whitmer.  The terrorist plot was thwarted after 
co-conspirators were arrested attempting to purchase deadly explosives from an 
undercover FBI agent.  The explosives were going to be used to execute the 
kidnapping plot.  Focusing on the January 6th siege of the U.S. Capitol and deadly 
scheme to kidnap the Michigan governor, the government clearly has a compelling 
interest in preventing domestic terrorism. 
Second, banning material support to a designated DTO would further the 
government’s compelling interest.  In enacting § 2339B, Congress found that foreign 
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are “so tainted by their criminal conduct 
that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”196  The same 
can be said for the provision of material support to domestic terror groups, including 
financial assistance.  Money is fungible and regardless of the intent of the donor, such 
funds “could be redirected to funding the group’s violent activities.”197  Other forms 
of assistance such as military-style training and provision of weapons and explosives 
could also be used to promote terrorism and should be banned.198   
Third, a domestic material support statute modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 2339B 
would not violate freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.  The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment does not protect 
speech directed at overthrowing the government by force.199  “These cases make clear 
that a line exists between expressions of belief, which are protected by the First 
Amendment, and threatened or actual uses of force, which are not.”200  Furthermore, 
numerous federal crimes can be committed by speech alone.  For example, 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 2 makes it unlawful to “counsel[], command[], induce[,] or procure[]” the 
commission of an offense against the United States.201  Section 371 makes it a crime 
to “conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States.”202  Additionally, § 
373 makes it a crime to “solicit[], command[], induce[], or otherwise endeavor[] to 
persuade” another person to commit a crime of violence.203  All of these offenses are 
committed through speech.  “[I]f the evidence shows that the speeches crossed the 
line into criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal activity, or conspiracy to 
violate the laws, the prosecution is permissible.”204  In United States v. Rahman, the 
Second Circuit rejected the defendants’ First Amendment challenges to prosecution 
under the seditious conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2384.205  The court stated, 
“[n]otwithstanding that political speech and religious exercise are among the 
activities most jealously guarded by the First Amendment, one is not immunized from 
prosecution for such speech-based offenses merely because one commits them 
through the medium of political speech or religious preaching.”206  
A domestic material statute would not violate First Amendment freedom of 
speech because it does not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind.  
A domestic material support statute should only cover a narrow category of speech 
“under the direction of, or in coordination with” domestic groups that the speaker 
knows to be domestic terrorist organizations.207  Individuals that support and 
sympathize with the political ideology and racist views of these domestic 
organizations could speak and write freely about these groups.  These individuals 
could engage in peaceful protests against the government and promote white 
supremacy and anti-Semitism.  This conduct would not be banned by the statute.  A 
proposed statute should not restrict or prohibit independent political advocacy of any 
kind.   
Finally, the domestic material support statute would not violate freedom of 
association under the First Amendment.  The statute should not penalize mere 
association with a domestic terrorist organization or prohibit vigorously promoting 
and supporting the political goals of the group.208  Any burden on freedom of 
association is justified for the same reasons articulated for prohibiting speech 
intended to incite violence or promote terrorism.209  Furthermore, any groups 
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 CONCLUSION  
 
 Domestic violent, extremist groups motivated and inspired by “a mix of 
sociopolitical, ideological, and personal grievances against their targets” pose a clear 
and present danger to national security.210  At least two right-wing, anti-government 
militia groups, the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, assumed a prominent role in the 
attack on the U.S. Capitol.  Members of a Michigan-based militia group allegedly 
conspired to kidnap the Michigan governor.  Both incidents threatened national 
security.  These violent, conspiratorial plots were aided and abetted by other 
individuals.  Currently, federal laws are inadequate to hold the enablers and 
facilitators of these violent crimes accountable. 
 To address this serious gap in the law, Congress should enact a statute 
criminalizing material support to DTOs.  The proposed statute should be modeled 
after 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which prohibits the provision of material support to a foreign 
terrorist organization.  Whoever knowingly provides material support for terrorism 
should be criminally prosecuted.  The law should not distinguish between whether 
the group is a foreign or domestic terrorist organization.  In either case, the provision 
of material support promotes terrorism.   
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of § 2339B against a claim that it violated freedom of speech and 
association guaranteed by the First Amendment.211  The Court held that the material 
support statute does not punish independent political advocacy, but only speech under 
the direction and control of an FTO.  The reasoning of the Court has equal application 
to the proposed domestic material support and would therefore withstand a First 
Amendment challenge.    
Furthermore, to address First Amendment concerns, the proposed statute 
should impose a more rigorous standard for designating a “domestic terrorist 
organization” than is currently required for designating a foreign terrorist 
organization.  Not every criminal group that commits acts of violence should be 
designated a DTO.  Only domestic groups that pose a grave threat to national security 
should be designated as such.  Whether a group threatens national security should be 
based on three factors: (1) the professed ideology of the group; (2) its organizational 
structure; and (3) documented history of violence.  
If the domestic organization’s mission is to overthrow the government, kill 
and kidnap elected officials, and use unlawful force to oppose government policy, the 
group poses a danger to national security.  Violent hate groups that target individuals 
for killing based on their ethnicity, nationality, or religion pose a similar threat.  
Additionally, domestic groups with a chain-of-command structure and ability to plan 
and execute violent attacks pose a grave security threat.  The other important 
designation factor is the group’s history of violent behavior and whether it engages 
in domestic terrorism.  If a domestic group embraces a violent, extremist ideology, is 
well organized, and engages in acts of domestic terrorism, the group should be 
designated a DTO.  The provision of material support and resources to such 
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organizations should be banned and criminalized.  Congress should immediately 
enact legislation prohibiting material support to domestic terrorists.  Such legislation 
is needed to prevent acts of domestic terrorism and protect national security.  
Criminalizing material support to domestic terrorist organizations is a national 
security imperative. 
 
 
